Are Foreign Exchange Intervention and Monetary Policy Related and Does It Really Matter? by Lewis, Karen K
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Finance Papers Wharton Faculty Research
4-1995
Are Foreign Exchange Intervention and Monetary
Policy Related and Does It Really Matter?
Karen K. Lewis
University of Pennsylvania
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers
Part of the Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/226
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lewis, K. K. (1995). Are Foreign Exchange Intervention and Monetary Policy Related and Does It Really Matter?. Journal of Business,
68 (2), 185-214. Retrieved from http://repository.upenn.edu/fnce_papers/226
Are Foreign Exchange Intervention and Monetary Policy Related and
Does It Really Matter?
Abstract
The relationship between foreign exchange intervention and monetary policy underlies the question of
whether sterilized interventions can affect the exchange rate. In this article, I examine this relationship using
data on U.S. foreign exchange interventions from 1985 to 1990, recently made publicly available. I examine
whether interventions could be viewed as "signaling" changes in future monetary policy variables. I also
consider whether changes in monetary policy may induce interventions in an effort by central bankers to "
lean against the wind" of exchange rate movements. Interestingly, I find evidence both that interventions help
predict monetary policy variables and that monetary variables help predict interventions.
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 Are Foreign Exchange
 Intervention and Monetary
 Policy Related, and Does It
 Really Matter?*
 Over the last 2 decades, the question of how ster-
 ilized interventions can affect the exchange rate
 has been the focus of a great deal of attention in
 both academic and policy-making circles. Cen-
 tral to this debate has been the observation that
 sterilized interventions do not alter the relative
 money supplies of countries and therefore should
 not have any obvious effect on the exchange
 rate. In the 1970s and early 1980s, it was thought
 that these interventions might affect the ex-
 change rate through a "portfolio balance" chan-
 nel. Subsequent empirical research has found
 this story to be highly implausible, however.'
 An alternative possibility, suggested by Mussa
 (1981), is that intervention may signal changes in
 future monetary policy. This explanation would
 say that central banks may signal a more contrac-
 tionary future monetary policy by buying domes-
 tic currency in the foreign exchange market to-
 day. Therefore, the expectations of future tighter
 The relationship be-
 tween foreign exchange
 intervention and mone-
 tary policy underlies
 the question of whether
 sterilized interventions
 can affect the exchange
 rate. In this article, I
 examine this relation-
 ship using data on U.S.
 foreign exchange inter-
 ventions from 1985 to
 1990, recently made
 publicly available. I ex-
 amine whether inter-
 ventions could be
 viewed as "signaling"
 changes in future mone-
 tary policy variables. I
 also consider whether
 changes in monetary
 policy may induce inter-
 ventions in an effort by
 central bankers to
 "lean against the
 wind" of exchange rate
 movements. Interest-
 ingly, I find evidence
 both that interventions
 help predict monetary
 policy variables and
 that monetary variables
 help predict interven-
 tions.
 * I am grateful to Hans Genberg and an anonymous referee
 for comments, to Hyungdo Ahn for research assistance, and
 to Ralph Smith for the intervention data as well as useful
 conversations about the conduct of intervention policy. Any
 errors are mine alone.
 1. For example, Rogoff (1984), Lewis (1988), and others
 as surveyed in Edison (1992) find no evidence of a portfolio
 balance channel. However, Dominguez and Frankel (1993)
 find some support for this channel under the assumptions that
 an international capital asset pricing model holds and that
 exchange rate expectations can be measured with survey
 data.
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 monetary policy will make the exchange rate appreciate, even though
 the monetary effects of the intervention are currently offset. Since this
 signaling story was first proposed, a number of academic studies have
 emphasized it, and Federal Reserve publications have even claimed
 signaling to be a reason for and against intervening.2
 If intervention provides a signal of future monetary policy, then the
 intervention should indeed be followed by changes in monetary policy
 variables. Therefore, in this article, I ask whether interventions help
 predict changes in monetary policy by examining the relationship be-
 tween intervention and monetary policy variables.3 Despite the obvi-
 ous importance of this issue, its direct analysis has only recently been
 made possible by the release of actual intervention data to the public.
 In Section I, I begin with an illustrative example of how intervention
 can affect the exchange rate through changing expectations of future
 monetary policy. I then test this relationship with Granger-causality
 tests of intervention on various U.S. monetary policy variables. These
 monetary policy variables include MI, monetary base, nonborrowed
 reserves, and the Federal Reserve (Fed) funds rate, as well as the
 differential between the Fed funds rate relative to some foreign interest
 rates. For many cases, there is a significant relationship between inter-
 vention and changes in monetary aggregates. However, innovations to
 intervention are generally correlated with changes in monetary aggre-
 gates only within a short 2-week period. Furthermore, the coefficients
 relating intervention to future monetary policy are often the wrong
 sign to be consistent with the signaling story.
 I therefore ask in Section II whether intervention is instead a re-
 sponse to economic conditions as reflected in the monetary variables.
 In this case, all of the variables except monetary base appear to explain
 intervention. These basic results continue to hold when intervention
 is treated as a limited dependent variable. Again, however, these rela-
 tionships are strongest within a 2-week period.
 One reason why intervention and monetary policy may be correlated
 during the 2-week period is the way in which sterilized intervention
 takes place. Section III describes how the nature of the Federal Re-
 serve operating procedures together with foreign exchange interven-
 2. For empirical studies discussing signaling, see Dominguez (1987) as well as other
 references in Edison (1992). Signaling has been used as a reason against intervention at
 Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) meetings (e.g., the minutes of FOMC meet-
 ing, August 22, 1989, in Federal Reserve Board 1989).
 3. While I use actual intervention data, Kaminsky and Lewis (1993) use market obser-
 vations of days when central banks were intervening to test whether market participants
 would have considered intervention to be a signal. We used these observations to esti-
 mate a regime-switching process for money supply. In a similar vein, Klein and Rosen-
 gren (1991, 1992) examine the relationship between market observations of intervention
 and discount rate changes by the Group of Three countries.
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 tion can induce a lag between intervention and sterilization, particu-
 larly during 2-week intervals corresponding to required reserves
 accounting periods. When the Granger-causality tests are performed
 after lagging intervention by 1-2 weeks, there is no longer much evi-
 dence that intervention helps predict monetary aggregates.
 In Section IV, I consider whether a correlation between intervention
 and monetary policy would help explain the exchange rate anyway.
 That is, the signaling story presumes that changes in the money supply
 in fact affect the exchange rate, while empirical studies have found
 little evidence that money supply changes are statistically related to
 the exchange rate.4
 These findings mirror early empirical findings that money supply
 innovations induce a positive or insignificant effect on the interest
 rate.5 These findings have recently been criticized on the grounds that
 broad monetary aggregates typically used by the early studies contain
 a significant component that is not under the control of the Federal
 Reserve. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1991, 1992a, 1992b) argue that
 nonborrowed reserves provide a better measure of money supply inno-
 vations. By contrast, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) propose the Federal
 funds rates as a monetary policy indicator and find that this measure
 is a better predictor of real economic activity than any monetary ag-
 gregate.
 This debate suggests a reexamination of the monetary policy shock
 and exchange rate relationship as well. Broader monetary aggregates
 may include money demand shocks that are inappropriate for evaluat-
 ing the effects of money supply innovations on the exchange rate.
 Therefore, in this article, I ask whether nonborrowed reserves or Fed
 funds rates provide different implications than MI for this relationship.
 I address this question by estimating the impulse response functions
 of the deutsche mark (DM)/dollar and the yen/dollar exchange rates
 arising from these monetary shocks. Interestingly, I find that the mone-
 tary variables affect the exchange rates in the expected direction.
 These results provide new evidence as well as new questions about
 the relationship between exchange rates, monetary variables, and in-
 tervention. I conclude by noting the limitations of these results and
 pointing to some important directions for future research.
 I. Does Intervention Help "Signal" Future Monetary Variables?
 The "signaling hypothesis" states that interventions induce traders in
 the market to alter their expectations of future monetary policy. This
 4. See, e.g., Meese and Rogoff (1983). In contrast, Mark (1993) finds a significant
 relationship between money supplies and exchange rates over long horizons.
 5. See, e.g., Mishkin (1981, 1982) and the references in Christiano and Eichenbaum
 (1991).
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 hypothesis requires that interventions are in fact related to monetary
 variables in a systematic way. In this section, I first provide a simple
 example to illustrate what people may mean when they talk about
 this hypothesis. I then present evidence on the relationship between
 intervention and monetary policy.
 A. A Simple Example of the Signaling Hypothesis
 Consider a standard asset-pricing model
 00
 S= (1 - 0) ZOiEtft+j, (1)
 J=o
 where s is the log exchange rate, f is the log of "fundamentals," and
 0 is a discount factor. In monetary models of the exchange rate, 0 =
 I/(l + (x), where ax is the semielasticity of money demand.6 More
 specifically, let ft be given by
 t = (mt,- m,* + v, (2)
 where m and m * are the domestic and foreign monetary policy vari-
 ables and v measures other fundamentals out of the control of the
 monetary authorities.
 For simplicity, I will assume that m* and v are exogenous and are
 mutually uncorrelated. In this case, it can be shown that the exchange
 rate solution is composed of two components. The first component
 depends on the expectations of future domestic money, m. The second
 component depends on current expectations of future values of m*
 and v.7 To focus on the role of monetary shocks, I will subsume the
 effects of v and m* by setting their values equal to zero so that ft =
 mt. This assumption implies that the effects of future expectations
 about these variables will be ignored. However, setting these variables
 equal to zero does not lose generality for studying the effects of inter-
 vention and domestic money on exchange rates since future expecta-
 tions of v and m* are by assumption independent of m and n.
 To correspond roughly with the empirical analysis above, I will treat
 the process of fundamentals as autoregressive in first differences:
 Amt = Pmtim_1 + Pnot-k + Ut, (3)
 where A is the backward difference operator, Pm is the autoregressive
 coefficient of fundamentals differences on their own lag, nt is foreign
 exchange intervention at time t, and i is a parameter relating interven-
 tion k periods in the past with a current change in money supply. The
 variable n is measured as purchases of domestic currency (sales of
 6. See, e.g., Frenkel and Mussa (1980) and Mussa (1982).
 7. See the discussion in Lewis (1989).
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 foreign currency) by the central bank. If the central bank is "signaling"
 with interventions that are consistent with subsequent changes in
 money supplies, then an increase in n at t - k will be correlated with
 a decrease in m in the future at time t. Therefore, a would be negative.
 Calculating the expectations in the exchange rate equation (1) re-
 quires a process for intervention. In keeping with the autoregressive
 structure above, this process is assumed to follow:8
 nt= Pnnt-i + et, (4)
 where E(etud) = 0.
 For a general lag k at which intervention signals monetary policy,
 the exchange rate solution can be represented as
 00
 St = mt-, + 5m(A~mt - P nt-k) + Pam , OiEtntk+j, (5)
 1=0
 where 5m (1 - PM) - The exchange rate depends on three compo-
 nents: the lagged money supply level, the discounted present value of
 the change in the money supply adjusted for the effects of lagged
 intervention, and the expected discounted present value of all future
 interventions. In particular, the current change in the money supply
 less intervention effects is discounted by 5m' giving the present value
 of the effects of the current monetary policy change on all future pe-
 riods. The effects of all future intervention on the exchange rate is
 also discounted by the monetary effects on all future periods as mea-
 sured by Ems
 As equation (5) shows, current interventions affect the exchange
 rate according to how they alter the expectations of future money
 supplies and thereby the exchange rate. This effect depends upon the
 parameter I. Note that when P equals zero, then according to equation
 (3), intervention conveys no information about future money supply
 changes. In this case, the last term in equation (5) shows that interven-
 tion has no effect on the exchange rate. In contrast, when expected
 dollar purchases as measured by increases in n signal future reductions
 in monetary policy, then P is negative. In this case, current and ex-
 pected future dollar purchases will lead to dollar appreciation today.
 To consider a more concrete example, suppose that the lag between
 interventions of dollar purchases and changes in the money supply is
 1 period, so that k = 1. In this case, the exchange rate solution is
 St = mt1 + bmAmt + I30m Bn t, (5')
 8. This process treats intervention as a continuous process for simplicity. As will be
 seen below, there are many days in the data when no intervention occurs, however.
 Kaminsky and Lewis (1993) treat the occurrence of intervention as affecting the future
 money supply relative to its level in the absence of intervention.
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 where 5m- (1 - Opn) - Clearly, a current intervention n, will affect
 the exchange rate in the direction implied by the signaling story as
 long as P < 0. In this case, an increase in current dollar purchases will
 increase the expected money supplies next period and thereby the
 exchange rate through the discount rate of money on the exchange
 rate, 0. The present value of this effect on all future expected interven-
 tion levels, and therefore money supplies, is measured by the product
 of the discount factors of money, 5m' and of intervention, An.
 If the lag between intervention and money supply changes, k, is
 longer than 1 period, then the example becomes more complicated but
 these basic features remain. The longer is k, the farther in the future
 current interventions are expected to affect the money supply and,
 therefore, the less impact interventions will have on the exchange rate
 today.
 B. Interventions and Monetary Policy Measures
 I now examine whether intervention helps predict future changes in
 monetary policy. The intervention series are daily interventions by the
 Federal Reserve from 1985 to 1990. The U.S. monetary policy vari-
 ables studied are MI, monetary base, nonborrowed reserves, and the
 Fed funds rate. These data are available at different frequencies. The
 shortest frequency of the Fed funds rate is daily, and that of MI is
 weekly, but monetary base and nonborrowed reserves are available
 only biweekly. The Data Appendix (App. A) gives the sources of these
 variables.
 Figure 1 shows some of these measures of monetary policy during
 the period of study. The top panel plots weekly observations of MI
 money supply together with the Fed funds rate. As the picture shows,
 the growth rate of MI accelerated during 1985 and 1986. At the same
 time, the Fed funds rate trended downward, in tandem with other
 interest rates. From mid-1984 to the end of 1986, most interest rates
 declined 5-6 percentage points. These downward movements were
 accommodated by two discount rate cuts in April and August 1986.
 Monetary policy was quite different during the period from 1987
 through late 1988. Largely in response to an increase in inflation, the
 Federal Reserve began tightening reserves in the second quarter of
 1987, and as a result most of the monetary aggregates rose at much
 smaller rates. The top panel of figure 1 shows the sharp deceleration
 in the growth rate of MI as well as the upward trend in the Fed funds
 rate extending into 1988. This tightening of monetary policy was accen-
 tuated with discount rate increases in October 1987, August 1988, and
 February 1989.
 Recent empirical studies have emphasized that movements in broad
 monetary aggregates such as MI can be misleading measures of mone-
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 FIG. I.-Relationship between monetary variables. A, weekly series. MI
 dotted line; Fed funds = solid line. B. biweekly series. MI = dotted line; Fed
 funds = solid line; Nonborrowed reserves = dashed line. Note.-Ml is in
 $10 million units. Nonborrowed reserves are in $1 million units.
 tary policy, relative to nonborrowed reserves. Panel B of figure I de-
 picts nonborrowed reserves against MI and Fed funds, observed only
 biweekly.
 C. Are Interventions Related to U.S. Monetary Policy Variables?
 To test whether intervention helps predict these monetary policy vari-
 ables, bivariate vector autoregressions (VARs) were estimated for
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 each monetary variable and intervention. In other words, equations
 were estimated for the systems
 [AM(i)t, nt]' = B(L)[AM(i)t, nt]' + Et, (6)
 and
 E(EtE') = V,
 where M(i) is the monetary aggregate for i = MI, monetary base
 (MB), nonborrowed reserves (NBR), or Fed funds (FF); where B(L)
 is a polynomial matrix in the lag operator, L; and where t is a bivariate
 independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variable with
 mean vector zero.9
 In order to combine intervention and monetary aggregates at differ-
 ent frequencies, several intervention series were formed. First, since
 MI is measured from Monday to Monday, the daily intervention series
 were cumulated over the same period. These data together with Mon-
 day Fed funds rates were used as the weekly frequency data series.
 Second, since monetary base and nonborrowed reserves are measured
 Wednesday to the second following Wednesday, a second intervention
 series was cumulated over the same period. These data were used as
 the biweekly frequency data series."
 The maximum lag length of these VARs was first tested with a Wald
 test of zero restrictions at each lag. As reported in Appendix table B 1
 these lag lengths were quite short. Except for the monetary base, the
 maximum lag length of these VARs were 2 weeks or less.
 Panel A of table 1 reports the results of Granger-causality tests of
 intervention on the monetary policy variables.11 Interestingly, the hy-
 pothesis that intervention does not help predict monetary policy at the
 biweekly frequency is rejected at the 90% confidence level for three of
 the four monetary measures. Furthermore, intervention is significantly
 related to the Fed funds rate at the weekly frequency.
 For the signaling story to be right, the coefficient on lagged interven-
 tion should indicate that dollar purchases are correlated with contrac-
 tionary monetary policy. When monetary policy is measured by mone-
 tary aggregates, the coefficient on lagged intervention should be
 negative. When this policy is measured by Fed funds, dollar purchases
 should raise the interest rate, so that the lagged intervention coefficient
 should be positive.
 9. Note that first-differencing the monetary aggregates in the VAR imposes the condi-
 tion that intervention is a stationary variable.
 10. MI and Fed funds were also used with this series. Experimentation with cumulat-
 ing intervention with MI from Monday to the second Monday and using Wednesday
 Fed funds rates did not alter the basic conclusions below.
 11. It should be noted that, while I use the standard terminology of "causality," the
 usual caveat applies here that correlation does not imply causality.
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 TABLE 1 Granger-Causality Tests of Intervention on U.S. Monetary Variables
 and VAR Coefficients
 A. Granger-Causality Tests
 Predicted Variables
 Frequency AMI AMB ANBR AFF
 Daily . . . . . . .. .318
 Weekly .306 ... ... .006
 Biweekly .093 .059 .843 .053
 B. Coefficients on Lagged Intervention-Daily Frequency
 Lags
 Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
 AFF -.02 -.11 .07 .01 .07 .08 -.09 -.02 .05
 (.07) (.11) (.06) (.05) (.05) (.06) (.07) (.05) (.05)
 C. Coefficients on Lagged Intervention-Weekly Frequency
 Lags
 Variable 1 2
 AMI .305 ...
 (.298)
 AFF -.002* .007*
 (<.001) (<.001)
 D. Coefficients on Lagged Intervention-Biweekly Frequency
 Lags
 Variable 1 2
 AMI .719
 (.428)
 AMB .354 - 1.094*
 (.633) (.512)
 ANBR - .015
 (.077)
 AFF .004* ...
 (<.001)
 NOTE.-Panel A reports marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that all lagged coefficients
 of intervention equal zero in a projection of the column variable on lagged own variables and interven-
 tion. Lag lengths were chosen by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) with a maximum of 10
 lags and forming a Wald statistic that all lags greater than or equal to k are zero, for k = 10, 9 ....
 The first lag that rejected this restriction was used as the lag length. The covariance matrix was
 corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity using Newey and West (1987). These tests are reported
 in Appendix table Bi. Panels B-D report coefficient estimates of VARs. The column variables are
 the first difference of monetary variables: MB = monetary base, NBR = nonborrowed reserves,
 FF = Fed funds rate. Standard errors are in parentheses.
 * Significant at the 95% confidence level.
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 Panels B, C, and D of table 1 report at the daily, weekly, and bi-
 weekly frequencies, respectively, the coefficient estimates on lagged
 intervention for each of the measures of monetary policy. Panel B
 shows that daily intervention has no discernible relationship with
 changes in the Fed funds rate. Panel C demonstrates that the coeffi-
 cient on lagged intervention for MI and Fed funds is the opposite sign
 from the signaling story for a 1-week lag, although not for Fed funds
 at a 2-week lag. Panel D reports the coefficients at the biweekly fre-
 quency. For MI and monetary base, the coefficients are again of the
 wrong sign at the first lag. However, the coefficient for monetary base
 at two lags is significantly of the sign predicted by the signaling story.
 The correlation between lagged intervention and Fed funds is again
 significant and, combining the effects of the first- and second-week
 lags, it is also positive.
 Overall, the evidence in table 1 provides a mixed picture of the
 signaling story. Lagged intervention is significantly related to future
 changes in weekly and biweekly Fed funds rates and biweekly MI and
 monetary base. However, the correlations are in the direction sug-
 gested by the signaling story only over biweekly Fed funds changes
 and monetary base changes.
 D. Are Interventions Related to Future Relative
 Monetary Policies?
 The theoretical example above illustrated that U.S. monetary policy
 relative to foreign monetary policy is the important variable for de-
 termining the exchange rate. Therefore, it may seem inappropriate to
 focus on U.S. monetary variables alone. Unfortunately, foreign money
 supply data are typically available only at a monthly frequency. Since
 the data sample is short, I cannot use monthly money supply data with
 much confidence.
 As an alternative I considered the interest differentials between the
 United States and two countries, Germany and Japan. The German
 and Japanese call money rates were used to correspond to an overnight
 interbank rate, as is the Fed funds rate. These variables were then
 used instead of the U.S. monetary policy variables above to, first,
 test the lag lengths and then to conduct Granger-causality tests. The
 lag-length tests are reported in Appendix table B2. As with the U.S.
 monetary policy variables, the lag lengths are quite short. Except for
 the differential between the Fed funds rate and the German rate, the
 lag lengths were all 2 weeks more or less.12
 Panel A of table 2 reports the results of Granger-causality tests of
 12. The Fed funds/German rate appeared to be somewhat sensitive to the day of the
 week that the variables were sampled. When the series were sampled on Wednesdays
 instead of Mondays, the lag length was 1 week. The longer lag structure is used in the
 estimation results below in order to provide more conservative estimates.
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 intervention on these interest differentials. However, the hypothesis
 that intervention provides no information concerning future interest
 differentials cannot be rejected in any case.
 Panals B and C report the coefficients on lagged intervention in these
 VARs to see if they indicate any pattern between lagged intervention
 and future monetary policy. However, the signs are mixed, and most
 of the coefficient estimates are insignificantly different from zero.
 II. Do Monetary Variables Help "Signal" Intervention?
 An alternative view of the correlation between intervention and mone-
 tary policy is that central banks intervene to try to maintain a monetary
 policy that is consistent with their targets of the exchange rate. In this
 case, changes in monetary policy with domestic targets in mind may
 induce counterproductive movements in the exchange rate. These
 movements in the exchange rate may, in turn, induce central bankers
 to intervene in order to try to "lean against the wind."
 Indeed, this type of behavior seemed to characterize Federal Re-
 serve policy for periods during 1988-90. In particular, while monetary
 policy remained relatively contractionary well into 1989, as noted
 above, the Federal Reserve intervened heavily to sell dollars for most
 of the period. Starting on June 27, 1988, the Federal Reserve sold
 dollars in the foreign exchange market, totalling $5 billion by Septem-
 ber 26. A second round of heavy dollar selling began on January 6,
 1989, despite the fact that monetary policy remained relatively tight.
 The conflict between the objectives to fight inflation by the Fed
 and to keep the dollar from strengthening, deemed desirable by the
 Treasury, became evident in meetings of the Federal Open Market
 Committee. During early 1989, debate increased among the governors
 on the Federal Reserve board concerning intervention carried out at
 the behest of the Treasury and the appropriateness of its signal toward
 monetary policy. By the FOMC meeting on May 16, 1989, intervention
 had become an important item of discussion as large purchases of
 foreign currency assets by the New York Federal Reserve Bank had
 increased its holdings beyond the legal limit. By the August 22 FOMC
 meeting, many governors were critical of the intervention policy. Gov-
 ernors Angell and Johnson dissented on a move that would allow fur-
 ther intervention stating "intervention confuses market participants
 concerning the policy commitment toward price stability" (minutes of
 FOMC meeting, August 22, 1989, in Federal Reserve Board 1989).
 A. Is There a Relationship between Monetary Policy and
 Future Interventions?
 As this discussion suggests, intervention and monetary policy may be
 related by a "leaning against the wind" policy in which monetary
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 TABLE 2 Granger-Causality Tests of Intervention on Interest Differentials and
 VAR Coefficients
 A. Granger-Causality Tests
 Predicted Variables
 Frequency FF - Rjpn FF - RGer
 Daily .472 .283
 Weekly .120 .581
 B. Coefficients on Lagged Intervention-Daily Frequency
 Predicted Variables
 Lag FF -Rjpn FF - RGer
 1 .066 .073
 (.053) (.051)
 2 -.058 -.031
 (.073) (.070)
 3 -.124 -.118
 (.105) (.105)
 4 .054 .059
 (.054) (.054)
 5 .012 .0 0
 (.044) (.047)
 6 .082* .079
 (.048) (.046)
 7 .053 .055
 (.053) (.051)
 8 -.077 -.073
 (.067) (.064)
 9 - .000 .000
 (.056) (.056)
 C. Coefficients on Lagged Intervention-Weekly Frequency
 Predicted Variables
 Lag FF -Rjpn FF - RGer
 1 -.091 -.047
 (.048) (.042)
 2 .025 .038
 (.053) (.061)
 3 ... .02
 (.052)
 NOTE.-Panel A reports marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that all lagged coefficients
 of intervention equal zero in a projection of the column variable on lagged own variables and interven-
 tion. Lag lengths were chosen by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) with a maximum of 10
 lags and forming a Wald statistic that all lags greater than or equal to k are zero, for k = 10, 9, ....
 The first lag that rejected this restriction was used as the lag length. The covariance matrix was
 corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity using Newey and West (1987). These tests are reported
 in Appendix table B2. Panels B and C report coefficient estimates of VARs. The column variables
 are FF = Fed funds rate, Rjpn is the Japanese call money rate, and RGer is the German call money
 rate. Standard errors are in parentheses.
 * Significant at the 90% level.
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 policy helps predict future changes in intervention. To evaluate this
 possibility, table 3 reports marginal significance levels from Granger-
 causality tests of intervention on the monetary aggregates in each col-
 umn. Interventions appear to be predictable at the biweekly frequency
 both from Fed funds rate changes and from nonborrowed reserves
 changes, although this relationship is less apparent from the broader
 monetary aggregates. In contrast, Fed funds rate changes at the higher
 frequencies of weekly and daily appear to contain no information about
 intervention changes.
 As reported in table 4, this pattern is reversed when Granger-
 causality tests of Fed funds differentials with foreign rates are used
 instead. In this case, weekly changes in interest differentials of the
 Fed funds against the Japanese and German call money rates provide
 no information about interventions. However, daily movements in
 these differentials appear to predict intervention movements, particu-
 larly for the Japanese case.
 Overall, movements in Fed funds and nonborrowed reserves appear
 TABLE 3 Granger-Causality Tests of U.S. Monetary Variables on Intervention
 "Causal" Variables
 Frequency AMI AMB ANBR AFF
 Daily . .. . .. . .. . 113
 Weekly .093 ... ... .615
 Biweekly .090 .635 .020 .027
 NOTE.-The table reports marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that all coefficients on
 lags of the column variable equal zero in a projection of intervention on lagged intervention and lags
 of the column variable. Lag lengths were chosen by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) with
 a maximum of 10 lags and forming a Wald statistic that all lags greater than or equal to k are zero,
 for k = 10, 9, .... The first lag that rejected this restriction was used as the lag length. The
 covariance matrix was corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity using Newey and West (1987).
 These tests are reported in Appendix table B1. The column variables are the first difference of
 monetary variables: MB = monetary base, NBR = nonborrowed reserves, FF = Fed funds rate.
 TABLE 4 Granger-Causality Tests of Interest Differentials on Intervention
 "Causal" Variables
 Frequency FF - R1Pn FF - RGer
 Daily .016 .077
 Weekly .283 .615
 NOTE.-The table reports marginal significance levels of the hypothesis that all coefficients on
 lags of the column variable equal zero in a projection of intervention on lagged intervention and lags
 of the column variable. Lag lengths were chosen by estimating a vector autoregression (VAR) with
 a maximum of 10 lags and forming a Wald statistic that all lags greater than or equal to k are zero,
 for k = 10, 9, .... The first lag that rejected this restriction was used as the lag length. The
 covariance matrix was corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity using Newey and West (1987).
 These tests are reported in Appendix table B2. The column variables are FF = Fed funds rate, Rlpn
 is the Japanese call money rate, and RGer is the German call money rate.
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 to be useful for predicting intervention at longer horizons of 2 weeks,
 while interest differentials are useful for predicting intervention at in-
 tervals less than a week.
 B. Treating Intervention as a Limited Dependent Variable
 The analysis above treated intervention as a continuous random vari-
 able since it can take any value on the real line. However, there were
 many days in which no intervention occurred, so that much of the
 distribution of intervention observations is concentrated at zero. The
 errors from regressions of intervention on other variables may there-
 fore be far from normally distributed in small samples. For this reason,
 I also treat intervention as a limited dependent variable that is a func-
 tion of lagged monetary policy variables.
 Intervention was classified into three cases defined as follows:
 It = 0 no intervention,
 It = -1 dollar sales,
 Ir= 1 dollar purchases.
 Using this measure of intervention, the probability of intervention was
 treated as a logistic probability function given by
 prob(It = 0) =
 _k
 exp go + E geAM(i)t-e (7a)
 [ k
 1 + exp [go + ZgeAM(i)teJ + exp [co + ZCeAM(i)t-e
 __1 (=1
 prob(It= -1)=
 _k
 exp co + E ce AM(i)t-e (7b)
 e=1
 1 + exp[go + E geAM(i)t-e] + exp[co + kCeM(i),e
 __1 (=1
 and
 prob(It = 1)=
 1 + exp [go + EgeM(i)te 1+ exp [co + c1AM(i),_
 __  ( =
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 where M(i) is the monetary variable; i = MI, MB, NBR, FF, as
 before; and k is the maximum lag in the vector autoregression esti-
 mated above for each bivariate system.
 The intuition behind these equations can be seen more readily by
 taking the logarithms of these probabilities, forming the odds ratios,
 and focusing on the case where k = 1:
 log[prob(I = -1)/prob(I, = 1)] = co + cliAM(i), 1, (8a)
 log[prob(I, = O)/prob(I, = 1)] = go + gjAM(i),_1, (8b)
 and
 log[prob(I, = - l)Iprob(I, = 0)] = (co - go) + (c] - g1) AM(i)M I. (8c)
 Now suppose that large increases in monetary variables induce a de-
 preciation in the currency and, thus, a dollar purchase intervention in
 response. If the Fed is "leaning against the wind," an increase in
 AM(i), for i = MI, MB, and NBR will increase the probability of a
 dollar purchase intervention (I, = 1) relative to a dollar sale interven-
 tion (I, = - 1), so that we would expect cl < 0. Similarly, the increase
 in M(i) should increase the probability of a dollar purchase intervention
 relative to no intervention in (8b), so that g, < 0. Finally, the increase
 in M(i) may decrease the probability of a dollar sale intervention in
 (8c) relative to no intervention, so that cl - g, < 0. For the Fed funds
 rate as the dependent variable, a similar relationship applies, but with
 the opposite sign.
 The constant coefficients in (8) have a similarly intuitive interpreta-
 tion. If there is no change in the money supply, so that AM(i) = 0,
 then the probabilities are simply
 prob(I,= 0) = exp(go)/[l + exp(go) + exp(co)], (9a)
 prob(I = - 1) = exp(co)I[1 + exp(go) + exp(co)], (9b)
 and
 prob(I,= 1) = exp(O)/[l + exp(go) + exp(co)] (9c)
 = 1/[I + exp(go) + exp(co)].
 Thus, the relationship between go, co, and zero indicates the probabili-
 ties of each intervention type when the monetary aggregate does not
 change.
 Table 5 reports the results of estimating the logistic probabilities for
 each monetary aggregate examined in tables 1 and 3. As column 1
 shows, movements in Ml are significant explanatory variables for the
 probability of intervention. Interestingly, both cl and g, are negative,
 as predicted by the "leaning against the wind" explanation. However,
 cl - 91 > 0, so that the increase in M(i) increases the probability of
 a dollar sale intervention relative to no intervention.
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 TABLE 5 Logistic Probability Estimates of Intervention
 k
 log[prob(It = - 1)/prob(It = 1)] = co + E cfAM(i),_ f
 f=1
 k
 log[prob(It = - 1)/prob(It = 0)] = go + E geAM(i)t_ e
 f=,
 AM(i) Co go cl g1 C2 g2 % Predicted
 Ml .734* 1.320* - .122** - .152** ... ... 52.3
 (.206) (.192) (.073) (.068)
 MB .959* 1.429* - .249** - .236* - .175 - .187 50.0
 (.334) (.319) (.127) (.120) (.129) (.122)
 NBR .559* 1.138* .188 .283 .. . . 53.5
 (.247) (.226) (.382) (.351)
 FF .456* 1.534* .073 - .012 .130 .032 64.3
 (.208) (.179) (.179) (.160) (.191) (.153)
 NOTE.-Standard errors are in parentheses. The frequencies of the estimates are Ml, weekly;
 MB, biweekly; NBR, biweekly; and FF, weekly.
 * Significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level.
 ** Significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level.
 The first lag of monetary base also suggests "leaning against the
 wind" behavior. Both cl and g, are significantly negative. Further-
 more, in this case, cl - g, is also negative, consistent with the view
 that increases in the monetary base reduce the probability of dollar
 sales interventions relative to no intervention. However, the second
 lags do not appear to affect significantly the likelihood of intervention.
 Despite the significant effects of MI and monetary base, neither
 nonborrowed reserves nor Fed funds appear to affect the probability
 of intervention. This pattern reverses the finding in table 3, where MI
 and monetary base did not predict the intervention variable, while Fed
 funds and nonborrowed reserves did. A reason may be that the logit
 estimation focuses on whether intervention occurs, while the Granger-
 causality tests in table 3 analyze the magnitudes of intervention. Varia-
 tions in the endogenous components in MI and monetary base may
 affect the decision to intervene, while movements in the monetary
 policy variables such as nonborrowed reserves and Fed funds may
 influence the magnitudes of intervention.
 III. Is the Operating System Responsible?
 A feature of the relationship between intervention and monetary aggre-
 gates found above is that the maximum lags in the vector autoregres-
 sions are typically 2 weeks. Of course, while an autoregressive process
 implies that shocks today persist indefinitely, moving average pro-
 cesses with innovations that disappear at fixed lags can look much like
 autoregressive processes. Thus, the relationships found above suggest
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 a possible alternative explanation for the apparent correlation between
 monetary variables and intervention.
 To understand this explanation, it is necessary to examine the op-
 erating system of the Federal Reserve together with intervention oper-
 ations. The domestic monetary policy is based on a borrowed reserves
 targeting procedure. Under this procedure, the FOMC selects a level
 of borrowed reserves to be used as an operating target, based on an
 assumed relationship between the Fed funds rate and borrowed re-
 serves. On a day-to-day basis, open market operations are primarily
 guided by an interim target for nonborrowed reserves based on an
 estimated demand for total reserves (subtracting out the borrowed re-
 serves component). The nonborrowed reserves target is changed on a
 daily basis as revised estimates of required reserves are received and,
 less frequently, as excess reserve estimates are reviewed."3
 Foreign exchange intervention affects the supply of nonborrowed
 reserves when the Federal Reserve receives payment by debiting the
 reserve account of a purchasers' depository institution. However, this
 intervention does not affect nonborrowed reserves targets. 14 De-
 pending on the elasticity of short-term reserves demand, the institution
 of the purchaser of foreign exchange can either allow its dollar reserve
 level to fall temporarily or else try to increase the reserve level to its
 former level. If the banking system as a whole is willing to allow
 reserves to fall in the short run, then the intervention may not be
 effectively sterilized immediately. However, given the biweekly ac-
 counting for required reserves, the demand for reserves will likely
 return to its previous level over the 2-week period.
 As a result of this complicated interaction of shocks to reserve sup-
 ply induced by foreign exchange intervention and short-run demand for
 reserves, the effects of intervention on reserves may not be completely
 sterilized immediately. Rather, sterilization may occur only over time
 as the demand for reserves returns to its previous level.
 If this story holds true, then the relationship between monetary ag-
 gregates and intervention during 2-week intervals may reflect in part
 the evolution of reserve demand. In this case, the correlations between
 monetary aggregates and intervention may have nothing to do with
 intentional signaling by the Federal Reserve.
 As a simple check on this possibility, the vector autoregressions in
 tables 1 and 3 were repeated, after lagging intervention by 1 period. If
 13. It should be noted, however, that the nature of the operating procedure changed
 during the sample period. Since late 1987, the Federal Reserve trading desk has adopted
 a more flexible approach to pursuing the borrowing objective, due to a striking instability
 in the behavior of borrowed reserves during that year. See Federal Reserve Board
 (1991).
 14. The Open Market Operations desk uses this information to update its forecasts
 of reserves on the settlement date. For most currencies, settlement takes place 2 days
 from agreeing to buy or sell foreign exchange.
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 TABLE 6 Granger-Causality Tests between U.S. Monetary Variables and
 Intervention Lagged 1 Period
 Frequency AMI AMB ANBR AFF
 A. Predicted variables:
 Weekly .424 ... ... .006
 Biweekly .893 .084 .708 .128
 B. "Causal" variables:
 Weekly .255 ... ... .615
 Biweekly .893 .707 .341 .367
 NOTE.-The table reports marginal significance levels for the hypothesis that lagged coefficients
 of intervention are zero in a projection of the column variable for panel A and for the hypothesis
 that lagged coefficients of the column variable are zero in a projection of intervention for panel B.
 See notes in tables 1 and 3 concerning lag lengths.
 the relationships between intervention and money are due to the nature
 of the operating system, then lagging intervention will increase the
 likelihood that the sterilization process has been completed.
 Table 6 reports these results. As the table shows in panel A, the
 hypothesis that intervention does not Granger cause monetary vari-
 ables cannot be rejected at the 95% confidence level for any variable
 except the Fed funds rate at a weekly frequency. Also, as reported in
 panel B, the hypothesis that monetary variables do not Granger cause
 intervention cannot be rejected for any of the monetary variables.
 Although this evidence is only suggestive, it supports the notion that
 the correlation between intervention and monetary aggregates may
 arise from a timing lag in the sterilization process.
 IV. Does It Matter Anyway?
 To this point, I have examined the relationship between intervention
 and monetary aggregates. The evidence indicates both that interven-
 tion helps predict changes in monetary aggregates and that monetary
 aggregates help predict intervention. Once intervention is lagged 1 pe-
 riod to help reduce the likelihood that the sterilization of the interven-
 tion has not been completed, intervention continues to help explain
 Fed funds movements. However, none of the monetary variables help
 explain intervention. This evidence suggests that intervention may in-
 deed help explain future movements in monetary policy, at least as
 characterized by Fed funds movements.
 I now consider a more basic question: does it matter if intervention
 explains monetary indicators? In the simple example described in Sec-
 tion I, intervention moves the exchange rate because its relationship
 with future monetary policy induces traders to revise their forecasts
 of future monetary variables, and these monetary variables affect the
 exchange rate. This signaling story relies on the underlying presump-
 tion that money matters for determining the exchange rate.
 Although all standard theoretical models use monetary variables as
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 key ingredients of exchange rate determination, empirical examination
 has found little evidence of such a relationship. Thus, an important
 question is, Does it really matter?
 A. Does the Exchange Rate Really Depend on U.S.
 Monetary Variables?
 To address this question, I estimated bivariate VARs of U.S. monetary
 policy variables together with the German DM/dollar rate and the Jap-
 anese yen/dollar rate and examined the impulse response functions of
 exchange rates to the monetary variable. Given the recent debate on
 the monetary transmission mechanism, it is interesting to compare the
 effects of different monetary indicators. I therefore examine the im-
 pulse response functions from three different measures of monetary
 policy.
 MI has been the most frequently used measure of money supply in
 previous studies. For comparison with these studies, the first monetary
 variable used is MI.
 The second monetary variable is motivated by the recent debate
 concerning the appropriate measure of monetary policy. Christiano
 and Eichenbaum (1992a, 1992b) argue that early studies of the relation-
 ship between interest rates and money supplies were incorrect because
 they used MI and other broad measures of monetary aggregates. Both
 of these aggregates include borrowed reserves that are positively corre-
 lated with the Fed funds rate and other interest rates since increases
 in these rates induce banks to borrow more at the discount window.
 Although borrowed reserves are a very small component of MI and
 monetary base, they display considerable variability. As a result, MI
 is frequently found to be positively correlated with interest rates, while
 subtracting out borrowed reserves gives a negative relationship with
 interest rates. Christiano and Eichenbaum find that when nonborrowed
 reserves are used as monetary measures instead of MI or monetary
 base, then innovations to nonborrowed reserves imply negative re-
 sponses of interest rates, as a liquidity channel would suggest.
 If MI contains a significant component that varies positively with
 interest rates, then this variable may also be inappropriate for studies
 based on a monetary model of the exchange rate that depends on a
 liquidity effect."5 Therefore, it is interesting to ask whether nonbor-
 rowed reserves innovations will provide stronger evidence of a mone-
 tary channel than MI. For this reason, the second monetary aggregate
 I use is nonborrowed reserves.
 The third monetary indicator examined is the Fed funds rate. Ber-
 15. For example, the model in Mussa (1982) is based on money demand equations
 such that shocks to money supply should imply a negative relationship with interest
 rates, consistent with the liquidity effect. If Ml shocks contain mostly money demand
 shocks, then shocks to Ml should be associated with an appreciation of the domestic
 currency.
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 nanke and Blinder (1992) find that this rate is a stronger predictor of
 real economic activity than monetary variables. They argue that the
 Fed funds rate is relatively exogenous in the short run as a result
 of Federal Reserve targeting and is the appropriate monetary policy
 indicator. 16
 B. Empirical Implementation
 To examine the effects of each of these three monetary variables, I
 estimated bivariate VARs of the logarithm of their levels together with
 the logarithm of the levels of the exchange rates. In order to compare
 the effects on exchange rates with studies of effects on interest rates,
 I follow the practice in the literature of estimating these VARs in levels
 to allow for possible cointegration among the variables and treat the
 monetary indicator as the first component in the vector. I also follow
 a procedure similar to the lag-length tests above to determine the lag
 length. Given a maximum lag length of 10 biweekly periods, I calcu-
 late the Wald test of zero coefficients for all lags greater than or equal
 to successively shorter lags until the hypothesis is rejected at the 95%
 confidence level. As before, the variance-covariance matrix allows for
 conditional heteroscedasticity, an important consideration in these
 systems since exchange rates are well-known to be heteroscedastic.
 The lag lengths and their marginal significance levels are reported in
 Appendix table B3.
 Given these lag lengths, the VARs were estimated similarly to equa-
 tion (6) above:
 [m(i),, st]' = B(L)[m(i),, st]' + et, (10)
 and
 E(ete') = I,
 where now m(i) is the logarithm of the monetary indicator; i = MI,
 NBR, FF; and s is the logarithm of the exchange rate for either the
 DM/dollar rate or the yen/dollar rate.'7 From the estimates of these
 VARs, the impulse response functions were calculated.
 In order to evaluate the significance of the responses in exchange
 rates, Monte Carlo experiments were performed to generate the empir-
 ical distribution of the impulse response functions. The Monte Carlo
 experiments were implemented as follows. First, the VAR in (10)
 above was estimated and the parameter estimates, B(L), and the fitted
 16. They also argue that the monetary transmission mechanism works because reduc-
 tions in reserves by the Federal Reserve reduces the amount of loans made to customers
 and, therefore, aggregated demand falls. For more on the argument, see Bernanke and
 Blinder (1992).
 17. The logarithm of the Fed funds rate was used to correspond to its treatment in
 Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992b). The essential results below are unchanged when
 using the level of the Fed funds rate.
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 residuals, et, were saved. From these estimates, the covariance matrix,
 A, was formed. The Cholesky decomposition of E was then calculated,
 and its lower triangular matrix form, G, was saved.
 Then, these next steps were followed repeatedly. (i) Generate a two-
 dimensional random variable, vp, the length of the number of observa-
 tions. (ii) Premultiply by G to obtain G'vt = et. (iii) Add these values
 for et to the right-hand side of (10), and generate the left-hand-side
 variables, [m(i)t, st]'. (iv) Estimate the vector autoregression in (10)
 and save the parameter estimates, B(L). (v) Using B(L), form the mov-
 ing average representation of the vector autoregression, and generate
 the impulse response functions. (vi) Save the impulse responses and
 repeat 300 times."8 From these observations, the 95% bounds on the
 empirical distribution were obtained.
 Figure 2 shows the estimates of the impulse response functions to-
 gether with the 95% confidence intervals for the DM/dollar rate. The
 top panel shows the effect of a 1% shock in MI. As would be predicted
 by a monetary model, the value of the dollar declines immediately and
 stays lower. However, the confidence intervals show that the deprecia-
 tion in the dollar is significant only between 4 and 16 weeks after the
 shock. Nevertheless, the significant effect of the shock of Ml on the
 exchange rate is somewhat surprising given previous research on ex-
 change rates.
 The middle panel of figure 2 shows the effects when nonborrowed
 reserves are used as monetary indicators. Unlike the Ml measure, the
 nonborrowed reserves shock has no immediate impact on the exchange
 rate. But quite interestingly, the depreciating effects on the exchange
 rate become significant after 4 weeks and remain significant even after
 20 weeks.
 The last column shows the effects of a shock in the Fed funds rate.
 Like nonborrowed reserves, there is no immediate effect on the ex-
 change rate. The point estimates imply that the rise in Fed funds in-
 duces an appreciation in the dollar after 2 weeks. However, these
 estimates are never statistically different from the 95% level (although
 they are at the 90% level).
 While these estimates would suggest that monetary measures might
 explain the exchange rate as standard models predict, the response
 functions for the yen/dollar rate in figure 3 give a different story. A
 shock to MI induces very little variation in the yen/dollar rate, and
 the confidence intervals are quite large. The point estimates of impulse
 responses to nonborrowed reserves shocks and Fed funds shocks gen-
 erally imply movements in the exchange rate in the direction suggested
 by a monetary model with liquidity effects. But the estimates are never
 significantly different from zero.
 18. Experimentation with the distributions from 2,000 repetitions for several of the
 VARs indicated that the results were little changed by more repetitions.
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 FIG. 2.-Impulse response functions of DM/dollar exchange rate from U.S.
 monetary shocks. The dashed line represents the 95% confidence interval from
 the Monte Carlo distribution. The solid line represents impulse response esti-
 mates.
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 the Monte Carlo distribution. The solid line represents impulse response esti-
 mates.
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 C. Does the Exchange Rate Depend on Relative
 Monetary Policies?
 The focus of the previous analysis on U.S. monetary policy variables
 alone is an important shortcoming. As discussed above, monetary
 models would imply that exchange rates depend on relative money
 supplies. While the lack of high frequency money supply data preclude
 an investigation of money supply differentials over the short sample
 period, interest rate data can provide some information about the
 stance of foreign monetary policy.
 Therefore, I estimated trivariate vector autoregressions similar to
 those examined in figures 2 and 3, but including the German and Japa-
 nese call money rates. In particular, the system estimated was
 [m(i),, r*, st]' = B(L)[m(i),, r*, st]' + et, (1 1)
 where r* is the logarithm of the German call money rate when the
 exchange rate is the DM/dollar rate and the Japanese call money rate
 when the exchange rate is the yen/dollar rate. Thus, the exchange rate
 was placed as last in the VAR order. These VARs were estimated, the
 impulse response functions calculated, and the Monte Carlo distribu-
 tions generated as above.
 Figure 4 depicts the impulse response functions of the DM/dollar
 rate from shocks to U.S. monetary aggregates controlling for the Ger-
 man interest rates. Strikingly, the basic pattern found in figure 2 contin-
 ues to emerge. A shock in MI is related to an immediate depreciation
 in the dollar. This decline is now statistically significant and continues
 for about 12 weeks. The nonborrowed reserves shock continues to
 imply a depreciation in the dollar even at 20 weeks. And finally, the
 Fed funds shock now becomes statistically significant after 6 weeks.
 Figure 5 depicts these same impulse response functions for the yen/
 dollar rate. As before, none of the impulse responses are significantly
 different from zero at the 95% level, although at the 90% level nonbor-
 rowed reserves are significant for some periods.
 Overall, the evidence suggests that changes in monetary policy af-
 fect the exchange rate in the direction implied by standard monetary
 models. Except for MI, however, there is little evidence of a contem-
 poraneous effect.
 V. Concluding Remarks
 This article has provided two new sets of empirical findings. First, it
 examined the relationship between foreign exchange intervention and
 U.S. monetary policy variables during the period from 1985 to 1990.
 The evidence suggests that there were significant correlations in both
 directions between the two variables. Second, the article analyzed
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 FIG. 4.-Impulse response functions of DM/dollar exchange rate from U.S.
 monetary shocks controlling for German interest rates. The dashed line repre-
 sents the 95% confidence interval from the Monte Carlo distribution. The solid
 line represents impulse response estimates.
This content downloaded from 130.91.116.186 on Fri, 14 Jul 2017 16:42:52 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 210 Journal of Business
 4.0
 3.2
 2.4
 1.6 - - -
 0.8
 0.0 - -0.0
 Weeks
 -0.8
 -1.6
 -2.4 -
 -3.2 -
 -4.0
 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
 MI Shock
 1.5
 1.2
 0.9
 0.6
 0.3-
 * 00 \Weeks
 -0.3 '-
 -0.6 N N
 -0.9
 -1.2 - -
 -1.5
 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
 NBR Shock
 0.5
 0.4 -
 - - - - - - - - - -
 0.3
 0.2 -
 0.1
 6% ~~~~~~~~~~~~Weeks
 0.0
 -0.1 - - - - - -
 -0.2
 -0.3
 -0.4
 -0.5 ,
 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
 Fed Funds Shock
 FIG. 5.-Impulse response functions of yen/dollar exchange rate from U.S.
 monetary shocks controlling for Japanese interest rates. The dashed line repre-
 sents the 95% confidence interval from the Monte Carlo distribution. The solid
 line represents impulse response estimates.
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 the effects on exchange rates of innovations to different measures of
 monetary policy variables suggested by the recent debate on the do-
 mestic monetary transmission mechanism. Interestingly, positive inno-
 vations in nonborrowed reserves appear to be more systematically
 related to depreciation in the dollar exchange rates than MI. This
 finding is consistent with the Christiano-Eichenbaum view that MI
 contains a larger endogenous component relative to nonborrowed re-
 serves.
 Generally, this article has produced new empirical findings in the
 relationship between monetary variables, foreign exchange interven-
 tion, and exchange rates. A continuing challenge for international re-
 searchers is to provide theoretical explanations for these relationships.
 In addition, the evidence here leaves open several particular issues
 and questions.
 First, the innovations in monetary policy variables did not control
 for real economic activity. The money supply decision presumably
 depends on variables such as the inflation rate and income growth.
 The short sample period of intervention precluded an analysis based
 on real variables measured monthly or quarterly. However, an issue
 for future research will be to reexamine the effect on the exchange
 rate using different measures of monetary policy controlling for real
 economic policy objectives.
 Second, the analysis in this paper focused on the behavior of U.S.
 monetary variables, while the exchange rate should depend on relative
 monetary variables. Once foreign monetary variables are introduced,
 the current debate concerning the monetary transmission mechanism
 is doubled. The parallel question of what variables to use as foreign
 monetary policy indicators arises, as does how these variables feed
 into real economic behavior. These questions also raise the issue of
 whether individual-country monetary transmission processes can gen-
 erate international feedback effects.
 Third, this article has only documented the empirical relationship
 between intervention and the money supply; the reason for this corre-
 lation is not yet apparent. Although I have suggested that lags in the
 sterilization process implicit in borrowed reserves targeting may be
 responsible, future research should analyze more specifically the
 source of this correlation.
 Appendix A
 Data Appendix
 Main Sources of the Data and Their Abbreviations
 Federal Reserve Bulletin (FRB)
 Bank for International Settlements (BIS)
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 Federal Reserve Statistical Release (FRSR). Washington, D.C.: Board of Gov-
 ernors of the Federal Reserve System, weekly.
 Individual Series
 Ml: Money Stock Measures and Liquid Assets, FRSR H.6 (FRB table 1.21),
 average of daily figures of week ending Monday.
 Monetary base: Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and the Mone-
 tary Base, FRSR H.3.
 Nonborrowed reserves: Aggregate Reserves of Depository Institutions and
 the Monetary Base, FRSR H.3.
 Federal funds rate: FRB
 German call money rate: BIS
 Japanese call money rate: BIS
 German mark/dollar exchange rate: Foreign Exchange Rates, FRSR G.5.
 Japanese yen/dollar exchange rate: Foreign Exchange Rates, FRSR G.5.
 Appendix B
 TABLE Bi Lag Length Tests for VARs of U.S. Monetary Variables
 and Intervention
 Frequency AMI AMB ANBR AFF
 Daily ... ... ... 9
 (.022)
 Weekly 1 ... ... 2
 (<.001) (.006)
 Biweekly 1 2 1 1
 (<.001) (.017) (<.001) (<.001)
 NOTE.-The table reports the first lag at which the hypothesis that all coefficients on lags greater
 than or equal to this number is equal to zero in at least one equation. The marginal significance
 levels are in parentheses and are corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity with Newey and West
 (1987). The maximum lag for the daily data is 10, while for the weekly and biweekly data it is three.
 These systems correspond to the systems in tables 1 and 3. VAR = vector autoregression, MB =
 monetary base, NBR = nonborrowed reserves, FF = Fed funds rate.
 TABLE B2 Lag Length Tests for VARs of Interest Differentials and Intervention
 Frequency FF - Rlpn FF - RGer
 Daily 9 9
 (<.001) (.004)
 Weekly 2 3
 (.031) (.007)
 NOTE.-The table reports the first lag at which the hypothesis that all coefficients on lags greater
 than or equal to this number is equal to zero in at least one equation. The marginal significance
 levels are in parentheses and are corrected for conditional heteroscedasticity with Newey and West
 (1987). The maximum lag for the daily data is 10, while for the weekly and biweeky data it is three.
 These systems correspond to the systems in tables 2 and 4. VAR = vector autoregression, FF =
 Fed funds rate. Rlpn is the Japanese call money rate, and RGer is the German call money rate.
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 TABLE B3 Lag-Length Tests for VAR Systems
 A. Bivariate (log X,, log Y.)
 Xt
 Yt Ml NBR MB FF
 DM 9 5 2 4
 (.0405) (.0395) (5.34E-09) (.0008)
 Yen 9 10 2 4
 (.0032) (.0393) (2.60E-06) (.0002)
 B. Trivariate (log X,, log R *, log Y.)
 Xt
 Yt, Rt* Ml NBR MB FF
 DM, Rer 8 8 8 4
 (.0315) (.0389) (.0338) (.0361)
 Yen, R JPn 10 10 10 7
 (.0365) (.0472) (.0118) (.0133)
 NOTE.-The table reports the first lag at which the hypothesis that all coefficients on lags greater
 than or equal to this number are equal to zero in at least one equation. The marginal significance
 levels are in parentheses. These systems correspond to the impulse response functions in figs. 2-5.
 VAR = vector autoregression, MB = monetary base, NBR = nonborrowed reserves, FF = Fed
 funds rate. RIP' is the Japanese call money rate, and RGer is the German call money rate.
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